1 00:00:05,640 --> 00:00:09,920 Chancellorsville had been Robert E. Lee’s  masterstroke, but heavy casualties and the   2 00:00:09,920 --> 00:00:16,000 death of Stonewall Jackson reduced a great victory  into a pyrrhic one. Worse, his supply situation   3 00:00:16,000 --> 00:00:21,960 was collapsing, and he was under pressure to help  the deteriorating situation out west. It was clear   4 00:00:21,960 --> 00:00:27,800 that the Confederacy was losing the war. Thus, Lee  concluded that another northern invasion was the   5 00:00:27,800 --> 00:00:33,880 South’s best, and perhaps final, chance to win the  war. This decision would embark the Confederacy’s   6 00:00:33,880 --> 00:00:39,480 most iconic general on a path towards perhaps the  most iconic engagement ever fought on American   7 00:00:39,480 --> 00:00:57,040 soil: the Battle of Gettysburg. Post-Chancellorsville Clarity  8 00:01:31,280 --> 00:01:36,720 Joseph Hooker’s Army of the Potomac returned to  its encampments near Fredericksburg by May 10th,   9 00:01:36,720 --> 00:01:42,080 and the Army of Northern Virginia reoccupied  their fortifications almost as if Chancellorsville   10 00:01:42,080 --> 00:01:47,840 hadn’t happened. Both armies required rest,  reorganization and replenishment, but only one   11 00:01:47,840 --> 00:01:53,240 would finish rebuilding before the next campaign  began. Even before Chancellorsville, Secretary   12 00:01:53,240 --> 00:01:59,280 of War Edwin Stanton and General-in-Chief Henry  Halleck had hated Hooker’s haughty personality and   13 00:01:59,280 --> 00:02:05,240 wanted him replaced. However, Hooker’s dispatches  let him shift the blame for the defeat. Both John   14 00:02:05,240 --> 00:02:10,240 Sedgwick and George Stoneman had clearly failed  to carry out their orders, for which Stoneman was   15 00:02:10,240 --> 00:02:15,680 dismissed from cavalry command, while 11th Corps’  commander O.O. Howard hadn’t heeded Hooker’s   16 00:02:15,680 --> 00:02:21,000 warning about Jackson’s flank attack. President  Lincoln acknowledged that Hooker’s subordinates   17 00:02:21,000 --> 00:02:29,000 had failed him and allowed him to retain command. In exchange, Lincoln demanded Hooker attack again,   18 00:02:29,000 --> 00:02:36,240 which he refused. The Army of the Potomac was  normally 120,000 men strong but only had 75,000   19 00:02:36,240 --> 00:02:41,640 ready for duty . It suffered 20,000 casualties  during the Chancellorsville campaign, and   20 00:02:41,640 --> 00:02:47,680 35,000 enlistments had expired, with the troops  returning home. At the current replenishment rate,   21 00:02:47,680 --> 00:02:53,040 it would only be back to 90,000 by June.  Recruiting was done by the states, and many   22 00:02:53,040 --> 00:02:58,640 were having trouble filling their quotas. Generous  monetary bonuses kept the volunteers coming,   23 00:02:58,640 --> 00:03:04,000 with additional incentives offered to reenlist  veterans, but they weren't coming fast enough.   24 00:03:04,000 --> 00:03:07,960 Many states resorted to calling up militia  regiments, but they only served for a few   25 00:03:07,960 --> 00:03:13,040 months before heading home . In response, Lincoln  authorized the recruitment of African-American   26 00:03:13,040 --> 00:03:17,840 soldiers, starting with the 54th Massachusetts,  and Congress enabled states to begin drafting   27 00:03:17,840 --> 00:03:23,360 soldiers via the Enrollment Act. However, these  were long-term solutions, and in the short term,   28 00:03:23,360 --> 00:03:28,000 Hooker’s army would remain understrength. Lee’s Decision  29 00:03:28,000 --> 00:03:32,960 Meanwhile, Lee was conflicted. On the one hand,  Chancellorsville had convinced him that his army   30 00:03:32,960 --> 00:03:39,040 was invincible. On the other, the Confederacy was  in crisis. While both sides’ draft laws allowed   31 00:03:39,040 --> 00:03:44,400 men to hire substitutes or pay to avoid serving,  the Confederacy included numerous exemptions   32 00:03:44,400 --> 00:03:50,000 for the planter class. Consequently, the already  limited food supply collapsed as poor farmers were   33 00:03:50,000 --> 00:03:55,480 hauled off to fight. Their wives were now leading  bread riots across Southern cities , and desertion   34 00:03:55,480 --> 00:04:00,800 was rising. The non-slaveholding majority were  questioning fighting for the privileged few’s   35 00:04:00,800 --> 00:04:08,440 interests when they wouldn’t fight themselves. Worse, the Western theatre was collapsing. Ulysses   36 00:04:08,440 --> 00:04:13,280 S. Grant had crossed the Mississippi and was  bearing down on Vicksburg, while Nathaniel Banks   37 00:04:13,280 --> 00:04:18,520 marched on Port Hudson. If either fortress fell,  the Red and Mississippi Rivers would be lost,   38 00:04:18,520 --> 00:04:23,560 and with them, Texas’ critical supplies of  horses and beef. Joseph Johnston and Jefferson   39 00:04:23,560 --> 00:04:29,160 Davis thus asked Lee to send reinforcements  west to save the situation. Lee refused,   40 00:04:29,160 --> 00:04:33,680 as he didn’t believe he could intervene in  time. The Yankees only needed to take one   41 00:04:33,680 --> 00:04:39,240 fortress to close both rivers to the Confederacy.  The limited Confederate rail network was already   42 00:04:39,240 --> 00:04:45,000 severely overtaxed, and the most direct route  to Mississippi was exposed to Federal raids.   43 00:04:45,000 --> 00:04:50,000 Reinforcements had to travel a more circuitous  route, followed by a long march to reach either   44 00:04:50,000 --> 00:04:58,000 city, almost certainly arriving too late. Instead, Lee would reinvade the North. An   45 00:04:58,000 --> 00:05:02,000 invasion might draw away Federal troops  from Mississippi, and more pressingly,   46 00:05:02,000 --> 00:05:06,480 looting Northern supplies was the only option  to feed his army. There was nothing left in   47 00:05:06,480 --> 00:05:11,160 the South. Additionally, moving the war out of  Virginia for the summer would allow the farmers   48 00:05:11,160 --> 00:05:16,600 to get a crop sown and harvested, alleviating the  food problem. It would also provide some time to   49 00:05:16,600 --> 00:05:21,760 fix damaged infrastructure. Moreover, Lee was  convinced that an invasion of the North was a   50 00:05:21,760 --> 00:05:27,280 war-winning strategy. Lord Palmerston was still  open to recognizing the Confederacy, but he needed   51 00:05:27,280 --> 00:05:32,880 a decisive victory to overcome British public  opinion. Additionally, Lee believed that Northern   52 00:05:32,880 --> 00:05:38,360 morale was nearing collapse. Both sides read  the other’s newspapers, but for unknown reasons,   53 00:05:38,360 --> 00:05:44,240 Lee only received anti-war Copperhead papers,  which wildly exaggerated Northern war-weariness,   54 00:05:44,240 --> 00:05:49,280 material shortages and desire for peace.  Consequently, Lee incorrectly believed that   55 00:05:49,280 --> 00:05:54,400 the Union war effort was as close to collapse  as the Confederacy’s. Therefore, a victory on   56 00:05:54,400 --> 00:05:59,640 Northern soil would finally win international  recognition and force the war to end.  57 00:06:01,800 --> 00:06:07,720 First, Lee had to reorganize his army. New  conscripts brought his strength up to 75,000,   58 00:06:07,720 --> 00:06:13,320 but Stonewall Jackson was irreplaceable, and  his command had to be split into two new corps.   59 00:06:13,320 --> 00:06:18,760 Jackson’s subordinates Richard Ewell and AP  Hill would command the 2nd and new 3rd corps,   60 00:06:18,760 --> 00:06:24,080 respectively, alongside James Longstreet’s  1st corps. Unfortunately, both men were used   61 00:06:24,080 --> 00:06:30,000 to Jackson’s highly detailed and specific orders  and struggled to adjust to Lee’s vague directives.   62 00:06:30,000 --> 00:06:34,920 Worse, Lee didn’t actually speak English but  a dialect called Southern Gentleman , which   63 00:06:34,920 --> 00:06:40,760 replaced entire paragraphs of dialogue with  meaningful pauses, glances, and aristocratic   64 00:06:40,760 --> 00:06:46,800 bearing. Longstreet and Jackson understood this  dialect and “heard” the details and intentions   65 00:06:46,800 --> 00:06:52,120 Lee left unsaid, but Hill and Ewell didn’t.  Consequently, they frequently misunderstood   66 00:06:52,120 --> 00:06:58,280 Lee’s orders. Lee had to reach Pennsylvania this  time, so he planned to move faster and in greater   67 00:06:58,280 --> 00:07:03,760 secrecy than during the Maryland Campaign. The  army would quietly slip away from Fredericksburg   68 00:07:03,760 --> 00:07:09,000 before clearing and then moving up the Shenandoah  Valley to hide the march. From there, they would   69 00:07:09,000 --> 00:07:14,560 spread out into Pennsylvania, acquiring supplies.  Once the Union army engaged, his forces would   70 00:07:14,560 --> 00:07:19,840 rapidly reconcentrate to win the decisive battle. The Campaign Begins - June 1863 - Brandy Station  71 00:07:19,840 --> 00:07:25,320 Ewell began slipping away on June 3rd. The next  day, Federal sentries reported movement in the   72 00:07:25,320 --> 00:07:30,600 rebel camp. Hooker cancelled everyone’s leave and  ordered the army to prepare for action on June   73 00:07:30,600 --> 00:07:35,800 5th. Sedgwick launched a reconnaissance-in-force  that night, which found weakened but still   74 00:07:35,800 --> 00:07:41,400 formidable Confederate defences and withdrew with  prisoners for the Bureau of Military Information.   75 00:07:41,400 --> 00:07:48,880 Their interrogation yielded little intelligence  beyond confirming parts of the army were moving.  76 00:07:48,880 --> 00:07:54,920 On June 6th, John Buford reported Confederate  cavalry in Culpeper County. The BMI confirmed   77 00:07:54,920 --> 00:07:59,800 that J.E.B. Stuart was concentrating his  forces while Lee appeared to be moving   78 00:07:59,800 --> 00:08:05,000 southwest toward Richmond. Fearing a major  raid, Hooker dispatched the cavalry corps,   79 00:08:05,000 --> 00:08:09,560 now under Alfred Pleasonton and riding in  two wings with infantry support, to confront   80 00:08:09,560 --> 00:08:15,920 Stuart. At 04:30 on June 9th, Buford crossed the  Rappahannock at Beverly’s Ford, surprising and   81 00:08:15,920 --> 00:08:21,200 scattering rebel vedettes in the dense fog. He’d  stumbled on Stuart’s camp, which was alerted by   82 00:08:21,200 --> 00:08:26,960 the gunfire. The nearest brigade lurched out of  bed onto unsaddled horses to engage, delaying   83 00:08:26,960 --> 00:08:34,840 Buford long enough for Stuart’s horse artillery  to position itself on knolls and open fire .  84 00:08:34,840 --> 00:08:39,400 As the Confederates began drawing up around  the guns, the 6th Pennsylvania charged them   85 00:08:39,400 --> 00:08:44,720 near St. James Church, only to be driven off  with heavy casualties. Buford’s men dismounted   86 00:08:44,720 --> 00:08:49,800 and attempted to turn the Confederate flank with  carbine fire, only for the rebels to unexpectedly   87 00:08:49,800 --> 00:08:54,520 withdraw. Gregg’s division had arrived from  Kelly’s Ford, threatening the rebel flank   88 00:08:54,520 --> 00:08:58,960 on Fleetwood Hill. Stuart hurriedly  redeployed , moved in reinforcements,   89 00:08:58,960 --> 00:09:05,000 and repelled Gregg’s attack. A cycle of charges  and countercharges, supported by artillery, ensued   90 00:09:05,000 --> 00:09:10,720 until the Federals withdrew near sunset. While  tactically a Confederate victory, Brandy Station   91 00:09:10,720 --> 00:09:15,840 was the first time Federal cavalry had matched  the Confederates in skill and determination.   92 00:09:15,840 --> 00:09:20,640 This disturbed Stuart, as his trooper’s  elan was their only advantage. Previously,   93 00:09:20,640 --> 00:09:25,760 the Federals had only won cavalry engagements  through overwhelming numbers or surprise.   94 00:09:25,760 --> 00:09:30,800 Seeing them finally match the Confederate's skill  destroyed his men’s confidence, which Stuart would   95 00:09:30,800 --> 00:09:34,800 do anything to revive. Lee’s Advance  96 00:09:34,800 --> 00:09:39,560 With more reports coming in of Confederates  moving west, Hooker proposed moving on Richmond’s   97 00:09:39,560 --> 00:09:45,200 weakened defences, but Lincoln refused. Instead,  Hooker was ordered to find and destroy Lee’s   98 00:09:45,200 --> 00:09:50,600 army. Lincoln was now convinced that Hooker  taking Richmond was equivalent to Howe taking   99 00:09:50,600 --> 00:09:56,400 Philadelphia rather than Napoleon taking Vienna  and, therefore, strategically irrelevant. However,   100 00:09:56,400 --> 00:10:03,320 Hooker still didn’t know where Lee was,  as Pleasonton couldn’t get past Stuart.  101 00:10:03,320 --> 00:10:08,520 On June 14th, word reached Hooker that Ewell had  attacked the Winchester garrison , who’d ignored   102 00:10:08,520 --> 00:10:13,480 warnings from Halleck to withdraw at the first  sign of Confederates. Lee was clearly moving   103 00:10:13,480 --> 00:10:18,760 into the Shenandoah Valley, but his objective  was still unknown. Still, he had to respond,   104 00:10:18,760 --> 00:10:23,840 and Hooker ordered the army to march for Manassas  Junction, which held the crossroads to… wherever   105 00:10:23,840 --> 00:10:29,800 Lee was heading. Stuart’s cavalry screen continued  blocking Pleasonton’s attempts to uncover Lee’s   106 00:10:29,800 --> 00:10:35,120 movements, and Ewell began crossing the Potomac  near Williamsport on June 15th, deliberately   107 00:10:35,120 --> 00:10:40,640 avoiding Harpers Ferry’s garrison. Ewell quickly  moved onto Hagerstown while Longstreet and Hill   108 00:10:40,640 --> 00:10:45,520 crossed near Sharpsburg on the 17th, with all  generals sending out foraging parties as they   109 00:10:45,520 --> 00:10:51,560 advanced. Lee gave strict orders not to loot but  to pay for all supplies with Confederate money or   110 00:10:51,560 --> 00:10:56,640 army promissory notes, which were worthless  and less than worthless, respectively. Many   111 00:10:56,640 --> 00:11:02,040 northerners complained that it felt worse than  being robbed. Lee entered Pennsylvania on June   112 00:11:02,040 --> 00:11:06,960 22nd, and the alarm was raised. Stuart’s Ride  113 00:11:06,960 --> 00:11:11,920 Meanwhile, Hooker was still near Manassas  Junction, uninformed about Lee’s movements.   114 00:11:11,920 --> 00:11:17,360 Stuart had thwarted Pleasonton’s latest attempts  to find Lee the previous day before disappearing   115 00:11:17,360 --> 00:11:22,680 himself . Hooker ordered Pleasonton to scour the  countryside for rebels while gradually shifting   116 00:11:22,680 --> 00:11:28,760 the army north as a precaution . Stuart received  verbal orders from Lee on June 22nd to defend the   117 00:11:28,760 --> 00:11:35,040 right flank. However, Lee’s vagueness gave Stuart  enough interpretation room to go adventuring . To   118 00:11:35,040 --> 00:11:40,160 that end, he would reassert Confederate cavalry  dominance and ride around the Army of the Potomac   119 00:11:40,160 --> 00:11:45,800 again to rebuild his trooper’s confidence. Taking  his best brigades while the rest screened Lee,   120 00:11:45,800 --> 00:11:51,600 Stuart departed on June 25th, intending to  circle the Federal army, frighten Washington DC,   121 00:11:51,600 --> 00:11:56,840 and then rejoin Lee before he was missed.  However, word of Lee in Pennsylvania finally   122 00:11:56,840 --> 00:12:02,120 reached Hooker the same day, and he ordered  his men north in earnest to catch Lee. While   123 00:12:02,120 --> 00:12:06,880 Stuart successfully made it around Hooker,  capturing supplies and damaging infrastructure,   124 00:12:06,880 --> 00:12:12,600 he found his route back to Lee blocked by Union  soldiers. Worse, Judson Kilpatrick’s cavalry   125 00:12:12,600 --> 00:12:18,120 division, particularly George Custer’s Michigan  brigade, caught his scent and pursued. Stuart   126 00:12:18,120 --> 00:12:25,404 realized that he’d have to ride far harder and  further north than planned to regroup with Lee.  127 00:12:25,404 --> 00:12:27,760 Hooker Runs His Mouth, Gets Replaced The Army of the Potomac marched rapidly with   128 00:12:27,760 --> 00:12:33,160 Buford in the lead, followed by John Reynolds’  1st Corps, with Frederick as the rendezvous point.   129 00:12:33,160 --> 00:12:38,040 Halleck tried to tempt Lee back to Virginia with  a raid on Richmond’s outskirts , but it wasn’t   130 00:12:38,040 --> 00:12:43,560 threatening enough. Meanwhile, Hooker was fighting  with Halleck about reinforcements and impetuously   131 00:12:43,560 --> 00:12:48,840 wired Lincoln that if the Harpers Ferry garrison  wasn’t assigned to him, he’d immediately resign.   132 00:12:48,840 --> 00:12:55,120 Lincoln accepted on June 27th. The first choice  to replace Hooker was Reynolds, widely regarded as   133 00:12:55,120 --> 00:13:00,400 the best general in the army. He declined, and at  the recommendation of the other senior generals,   134 00:13:00,400 --> 00:13:06,720 command passed to George Meade on June 28th as the  army reached Frederick. While his men fearfully   135 00:13:06,720 --> 00:13:11,840 called him Old Snapping Turtle behind his back,  Meade’s troops had always fought better than other   136 00:13:11,840 --> 00:13:19,852 units. Everyone hoped that Meade could similarly  motivate the army to defend his home state.  137 00:13:19,852 --> 00:13:22,120 All Roads Lead to Gettysburg That night, Longstreet’s personal spy,   138 00:13:22,120 --> 00:13:27,720 Henry Harrison, warned him that the Federals were  quickly closing. Longstreet rushed to inform Lee,   139 00:13:27,720 --> 00:13:32,600 who was furious that Stuart hadn’t warned him.  His army was spread from Chambersburg to the   140 00:13:32,600 --> 00:13:37,120 outskirts of Harrisburg, skirmishing  with militia, holding towns to ransom,   141 00:13:37,120 --> 00:13:42,680 “purchasing” supplies, and kidnapping hundreds  of free African-Americans into slavery. He   142 00:13:42,680 --> 00:13:47,600 immediately issued orders to concentrate at  Cashtown. Henry Heath’s division from Hill’s   143 00:13:47,600 --> 00:13:53,160 Corps was first to arrive on June 29th, but he  heard that there were supplies, including shoes,   144 00:13:53,160 --> 00:14:00,200 in the nearby town of Gettysburg, the crossroad  of every road in southern Pennsylvania .  145 00:14:00,200 --> 00:14:06,240 Meanwhile, Meade settled into command. On June  30th, he made headquarters in Taneytown before   146 00:14:06,240 --> 00:14:12,000 issuing orders to advance towards Gettysburg,  the natural place to concentrate an army. He also   147 00:14:12,000 --> 00:14:17,400 began preparing positions along Big Pipe Creek  as a fallback position. Heath ordered Pettigrew’s   148 00:14:17,400 --> 00:14:23,080 brigade to Gettysburg to investigate the supply  rumours. As Pettigrew arrived, Buford arrived on   149 00:14:23,080 --> 00:14:28,200 high ground south of town. Pettigrew reported  the Federals to Heath after finding nothing of   150 00:14:28,200 --> 00:14:33,680 value in Gettysburg. Both generals thought it was  just militia, but a reconnaissance-in-force would   151 00:14:33,680 --> 00:14:38,960 be launched to be certain. Buford knew that  infantry moving in enemy territory without   152 00:14:38,960 --> 00:14:44,120 cavalry screens meant the main body was close,  and the high ground south of Gettysburg was a   153 00:14:44,120 --> 00:14:49,040 perfect defensive position. Knowing the hills  must be denied to the rebels, Buford prepared   154 00:14:49,040 --> 00:14:53,560 a delaying action north of Gettysburg,  then alerted Reynolds, who alerted Meade,   155 00:14:53,560 --> 00:14:58,760 before preparing a quick march to support Buford. Dawn of the First Day - 72 Hours Remain  156 00:14:58,760 --> 00:15:05,020 At 07:30 on July 1st, Heath made contact with  Buford’s vedettes astride Chambersburg Pike   157 00:15:05,020 --> 00:15:10,560 . Pushing through, Heath’s infantry encountered  Gamble’s dismounted brigade in cover along Herr’s   158 00:15:10,560 --> 00:15:18,600 Ridge. Despite being outnumbered 2750 to 7600,  the trooper’s breech-loading Sharps carbines   159 00:15:18,600 --> 00:15:23,920 allowed them to repel the initial probe through  weight-of-fire. However, the rebels reformed and   160 00:15:23,920 --> 00:15:30,000 made a more determined push. By 10:20, Heath had  pushed Gamble back to McPherson’s Ridge, where   161 00:15:30,000 --> 00:15:34,800 Devin’s brigade joined the fight. Heath still  would have pushed through if not for Reynolds’   162 00:15:34,800 --> 00:15:40,040 timely arrival. As his men replaced Buford’s  exhausted troopers, Reynolds was killed by a   163 00:15:40,040 --> 00:15:45,800 random bullet, and Abner Doubleday took command.  The Union right was pushed back before it got into   164 00:15:45,800 --> 00:15:50,800 position, but the left and center held as the Iron  Brigade’s reserve regiment counterattacked along a   165 00:15:50,800 --> 00:15:59,480 railroad cut, routing a Confederate brigade . Fighting paused at 11:30. Lee’d given orders   166 00:15:59,480 --> 00:16:04,160 to avoid a general engagement before the army  concentrated, but since Heath had accidentally   167 00:16:04,160 --> 00:16:09,920 caused one, the rest of Hills’ corps moved to  support him. Meanwhile, the 11th Corps arrived   168 00:16:09,920 --> 00:16:15,800 as Doubleday redeployed along McPherson’s and  Seminary Ridge. As the senior officer, Howard took   169 00:16:15,800 --> 00:16:21,440 command and requested all available reinforcements  move swiftly to Gettysburg. He was about to face   170 00:16:21,440 --> 00:16:26,880 two-thirds of the Army of Northern Virginia alone. Afternoon  171 00:16:26,880 --> 00:16:32,320 Ewell was obliviously approaching via the Carlisle  and Harrisburg Roads. He simply intended to use   172 00:16:32,320 --> 00:16:37,560 the crossroads to reach Cashtown, but he had no  idea that the battle was joined until the Federal   173 00:16:37,560 --> 00:16:43,760 infantry blocked his way. With Lee’s orders to  avoid battle now moot, Ewell prepared to attack.   174 00:16:43,760 --> 00:16:49,280 Rodes’ division moved into position and attacked  Oak Ridge at 14:00 . However, the lead brigade   175 00:16:49,280 --> 00:16:53,960 didn’t do any reconnaissance before marching into  the teeth of the defences, where they suffered   176 00:16:53,960 --> 00:17:00,400 devastating casualties. Lee arrived around  14:30. Accepting that battle couldn’t be avoided,   177 00:17:00,400 --> 00:17:06,120 he ordered all commands to attack . Hill’s troops  pushed the 1st Corps back to Seminary Ridge with   178 00:17:06,120 --> 00:17:12,040 heavy casualties all around. Meanwhile, Early’s  division had arrived down the Harrisburg Road.   179 00:17:12,040 --> 00:17:17,240 The 11th Corps was overstretched, and its flank  was exposed. Deploying his troops in a wider,   180 00:17:17,240 --> 00:17:22,600 deeper line than the entire Union position, Early  first assaulted the salient on Barlow’s Knoll   181 00:17:22,600 --> 00:17:28,840 before shattering the 11th Corps’ left flank,  forcing it into a panicked retreat by 16:00.  182 00:17:30,640 --> 00:17:34,720 Meanwhile, the 1st Corps artillery was  devastating the continued Confederate   183 00:17:34,720 --> 00:17:39,840 attacks with concentrated double-canister  fire. However, as more Confederates arrived,   184 00:17:39,840 --> 00:17:44,520 the position became untenable, and the left  was flanked by superior numbers. With the   185 00:17:44,520 --> 00:17:49,800 11th Corps routing, the 1st Corps began  retreating through Gettysburg at 16:30.  186 00:17:49,800 --> 00:17:50,960 The Critical Moment The defenders retreated   187 00:17:50,960 --> 00:17:56,280 to Cemetery and Culp’s Hills, where 2nd Corps’  commander Winfield Scott had assumed command,   188 00:17:56,280 --> 00:18:01,720 placing his corps on Cemetery Ridge and 12th  Corps’ vanguard on Culp’s Hill. The survivors were   189 00:18:01,720 --> 00:18:10,000 ordered to occupy Cemetery Hill and start digging  in. The high ground had to be held at all costs.  190 00:18:10,000 --> 00:18:15,720 Lee also realized the value of high ground.  Accordingly, he ordered Ewell to "carry the hill   191 00:18:15,720 --> 00:18:20,840 occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable,  but to avoid a general engagement until the   192 00:18:20,840 --> 00:18:26,200 arrival of the other divisions of the army." Ewell  looked at the steep slopes and deploying Federals,   193 00:18:26,200 --> 00:18:31,840 looked at his exhausted soldiers, and concluded  an attack wasn’t practicable . Lee meant,   194 00:18:31,840 --> 00:18:36,080 “Take that hill immediately. You won’t be  blamed for failure,” but this was lost in   195 00:18:36,080 --> 00:18:41,560 translation from Southern Gentleman to English.  This critical decision dictated the rest of the   196 00:18:41,560 --> 00:18:42,280 Battle of Gettysburg. That Night  197 00:18:42,280 --> 00:18:49,600 After dark, Hill and Ewell’s corps finished  arriving in Gettysburg alongside Longstreet’s   198 00:18:49,600 --> 00:18:54,240 vanguard. During the council of war, Lee  lamented that Stuart’s absence had left   199 00:18:54,240 --> 00:18:59,080 him without reconnaissance on Union strength  and positions. Stuart had just gotten around   200 00:18:59,080 --> 00:19:04,800 Custer’s pursuit near Carlisle that afternoon  and was looking for Lee. Longstreet argued that   201 00:19:04,800 --> 00:19:09,840 the Federal position was too strong to attack.  Instead, they should disengage and force Meade   202 00:19:09,840 --> 00:19:15,040 to attack them on favourable ground. However,  all the other generals refused. Leaving the   203 00:19:15,040 --> 00:19:20,400 battlefield meant admitting defeat, which could  shatter morale. Worse, Meade could ambush them on   204 00:19:20,400 --> 00:19:28,000 the road. They’d stay and fight tomorrow. Across the field, the 12th, 3rd, and 5th   205 00:19:28,000 --> 00:19:32,880 Corps had all arrived, but the 6th Corps was  still in Maryland and wouldn’t start arriving   206 00:19:32,880 --> 00:19:38,080 until late tomorrow. Meade arrived after  midnight. Unable to survey the battlefield,   207 00:19:38,080 --> 00:19:43,080 he asked Hancock about the position, who declared  it the best natural defensive position in the   208 00:19:43,080 --> 00:19:48,440 world. The army’s chief engineer, Gouverneur  Warren, agreed. The Army of the Potomac would make   209 00:19:48,440 --> 00:19:56,080 its stand along a fishhook of hills and ridges  stretching from Culp’s Hill to Little Round Top.  210 00:19:56,080 --> 00:19:58,920 Dawn of the Second Day - 48 Hours Remain At dawn on July 2nd, Lee assumed that the Army   211 00:19:58,920 --> 00:20:04,120 of the Potomac only occupied Cemetery Ridge,  Cemetery Hill, and Culp’s Hill . Therefore,   212 00:20:04,120 --> 00:20:10,000 an echelon attack up Emmitsburg Road would roll  up the unsupported Union flank. Lee ordered   213 00:20:10,000 --> 00:20:14,400 Longstreet to lead the attack, with Ewell  redeploying from the left to right flank to   214 00:20:14,400 --> 00:20:20,040 support him. Hill was incapacitated by illness,  and his corps depleted from the first day,   215 00:20:20,040 --> 00:20:25,880 so it would remain in reserve. Both generals  objected. Ewell didn’t want to abandon ground   216 00:20:25,880 --> 00:20:31,560 his men had died for, while Longstreet didn’t want  to attack at all. If he had to attack, then it had   217 00:20:31,560 --> 00:20:37,160 to wait. Only elements from two of his divisions  had arrived, with the trailing brigades due early   218 00:20:37,160 --> 00:20:43,360 afternoon. So, Lee compromised. Ewell would remain  on the Union right while Longstreet attacked the   219 00:20:43,360 --> 00:20:48,920 left once Hood and McLaws’ divisions assembled.  Across the field, Meade’s dawn reconnaissance   220 00:20:48,920 --> 00:20:53,400 proved Hancock correct. The corps was  deployed on high ground with interlocking   221 00:20:53,400 --> 00:20:58,720 fields of fire supported by interior lines  hidden by the ridge. Wherever Lee attacked,   222 00:20:58,720 --> 00:21:04,160 he’d be met by at least two corps. If he started  breaking through, Meade could rush reinforcements   223 00:21:04,160 --> 00:21:09,000 from anywhere to swiftly repel the attack. Sickles Ruins Everything  224 00:21:09,000 --> 00:21:15,400 This deployment was ruined by Daniel Sickles. He  resented Meade being promoted instead of himself.   225 00:21:15,400 --> 00:21:20,040 Moreover, he was deeply bitter about Hooker  ordering him to abandon Hazel Grove during   226 00:21:20,040 --> 00:21:24,920 Chancellorsville and that a peach orchard along  the Emmitsburg Road sat on higher ground than   227 00:21:24,920 --> 00:21:29,480 he occupied. Determined to not only show up  Meade but prevent another Chancellorsville,   228 00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:35,640 he moved the 3rd Corps forward from Cemetery Ridge  and Little Round Top without orders to positions   229 00:21:35,640 --> 00:21:43,280 along the Emmitsburg Road around noon . Meade didn’t discover this insubordination   230 00:21:43,280 --> 00:21:49,080 until Sickles failed to arrive at the afternoon  staff meeting. Finding him shortly after 15:00,   231 00:21:49,080 --> 00:21:54,280 a furious Meade tore into Sickles for having  moved into a salient outside artillery support   232 00:21:54,280 --> 00:21:59,280 and committing himself to holding a line too  long for a single corps. Worse, it was too   233 00:21:59,280 --> 00:22:04,280 late to correct the mistake, as Confederates  were spotted preparing to attack. Instead,   234 00:22:04,280 --> 00:22:12,360 Meade wheeled off to prepare a relief force. Longstreet was finally ready to attack at 16:00   235 00:22:12,360 --> 00:22:17,680 after a long march to hide his movements but  was surprised by Sickles’ advanced position.   236 00:22:17,680 --> 00:22:22,800 Hood argued for flanking Sickles and taking Little  Round Top, but Longstreet said there wasn’t time   237 00:22:22,800 --> 00:22:29,747 to redeploy before Lee’s patience expired. After a  30-minute artillery barrage, Hood’s attack began.  238 00:22:29,747 --> 00:22:32,200 Devil’s Den Hood ordered his men to take the heights.   239 00:22:32,200 --> 00:22:37,200 However, he didn’t specify which heights before  being wounded by artillery fire. Consequently,   240 00:22:37,200 --> 00:22:42,200 the attack was uncoordinated. Some regiments  began marching for 3rd Corps’ left flank,   241 00:22:42,200 --> 00:22:47,600 while others marched for Round Top. The 2nd US  Sharpshooters initiated contact from the base   242 00:22:47,600 --> 00:22:52,680 of Round Top and a boulder field called Devil’s  Den while the Confederates assaulted the entire   243 00:22:52,680 --> 00:22:59,080 line. The defenders repelled two assaults against  both Devil’s Den and nearby Rose Wood. However,   244 00:22:59,080 --> 00:23:04,400 Confederate numbers let them flank the defences  via Plum Run Valley. The fighting was so fierce   245 00:23:04,400 --> 00:23:09,880 that the valley was renamed the Valley of Death,  and the field was named Slaughter Pen. However,   246 00:23:09,880 --> 00:23:15,744 the pressure was too great for the  defenders, who began fleeing north.  247 00:23:15,744 --> 00:23:17,040 Little Round Top Meanwhile, a disaster was   248 00:23:17,040 --> 00:23:22,320 averted at Little Round Top. Sickles’ advance  had left only a Signal Corp post on the hill,   249 00:23:22,320 --> 00:23:28,280 whose barren top oversaw the entire battlefield .  Meade dispatched Warren to evaluate the situation,   250 00:23:28,280 --> 00:23:33,280 and after reaching the summit, he saw the glint  of bayonets heading his way. He immediately sent   251 00:23:33,280 --> 00:23:38,800 out riders to find troops to hold the hill. Strong  Vincent’s brigade from the 5th Corps was the first   252 00:23:38,800 --> 00:23:43,200 to respond, arriving just as the Confederates  gave up chasing the sharpshooters up Round   253 00:23:43,200 --> 00:23:48,600 Top and moved to take the more strategic hill . Though exhausted, the Confederates still launched   254 00:23:48,600 --> 00:23:53,800 a powerful assault on Vincent’s right, which  was repulsed. The attack began shifting left   255 00:23:53,800 --> 00:23:58,080 as the Confederates looked for the flank  held by the 20th Maine. Knowing there was   256 00:23:58,080 --> 00:24:02,960 nothing to his left but a few sharpshooters ,  Colonel Chamberlain first stretched his line,   257 00:24:02,960 --> 00:24:08,080 then bent it 90º, holding off multiple attacks  from three regiments who kept trying to flank   258 00:24:08,080 --> 00:24:13,760 him. Upon running out of ammunition, Chamberlain  ordered a bayonet charge, his bent left swinging   259 00:24:13,760 --> 00:24:19,160 down like a door. The Confederates routed, and  many were captured. However, the right flank   260 00:24:19,160 --> 00:24:24,920 nearly broke under heavy pressure, and Vincent was  mortally wounded. Reinforcements ultimately drove   261 00:24:24,920 --> 00:24:29,520 off the rebels around 18:00. The Wheatfield  262 00:24:29,520 --> 00:24:35,440 Across the field, McLaws finally attacked at  17:00. Moving in echelon formation, McLaws   263 00:24:35,440 --> 00:24:40,160 continued Hood’s attack on Rose Wood, finally  breaking through the defences and extending   264 00:24:40,160 --> 00:24:45,600 to the Peach Orchard. The hardpressed 3rd Corps  fought fanatically but were overwhelmed and began   265 00:24:45,600 --> 00:24:51,440 breaking. Sickles’s right leg was shattered  by cannon fire and later amputated . However,   266 00:24:51,440 --> 00:24:55,320 as the Confederate right broke through  Stony Ridge and entered The Wheatfield,   267 00:24:55,320 --> 00:25:00,320 Federal reinforcements arrived. Meade had  redeployed the 5th Corps along with one   268 00:25:00,320 --> 00:25:05,840 division from the 2nd Corps and two from the 12th  Corps to rescue the 3rd. The counterattack pushed   269 00:25:05,840 --> 00:25:11,280 McLaws out of The Wheatfield. Once his left  flank finished breaking the Peach Orchard line   270 00:25:11,280 --> 00:25:16,720 after sustaining heavy casualties, McLaws again  attacked and retook the Wheatfield. A flanking   271 00:25:16,720 --> 00:25:22,440 assault from Little Round Top pushed him out again  as casualties piled up in the Valley of Death. The   272 00:25:22,440 --> 00:25:28,320 Wheatfield would change hands twice more before  the Confederates conceded the fight at 20:00.  273 00:25:28,320 --> 00:25:32,520 Cemetery Ridge Further up the line, Lee added Hill’s   274 00:25:32,520 --> 00:25:37,280 freshest division to the assault. Anderson’s  division struck the remaining 3rd Corps division   275 00:25:37,280 --> 00:25:42,680 holding the Peach Orchard line, crushing it and  ending the 3rd Corps as a fighting unit. Anderson   276 00:25:42,680 --> 00:25:47,800 and McLaws continued the assault toward Cemetery  Ridge, where gaps had been left after defenders   277 00:25:47,800 --> 00:25:52,800 redeployed to The Wheatfield. Fortunately,  the long march left the rebels disorganized   278 00:25:52,800 --> 00:25:58,520 and required them to pause at Plum Run, giving  Hancock and Meade time to find reinforcements.  279 00:25:58,520 --> 00:26:02,440 The first counterattack came from  Willard’s brigade against McLaws’ right,   280 00:26:02,440 --> 00:26:07,760 shattering Barksdale’s brigade and mortally  wounding the general. Wilcox’s brigade would   281 00:26:07,760 --> 00:26:12,840 have pushed through a gap but for the 1st  Minnesota launching a suicidal bayonet charge,   282 00:26:12,840 --> 00:26:18,680 which succeeded in halting Wilcox at the cost  of all but 47 of the regiment’s men. Several   283 00:26:18,680 --> 00:26:23,520 units claimed to make the crest of the hill before  being thrown off by counterattacks and the rebels   284 00:26:23,520 --> 00:26:27,840 pulled back by 19:00. On the Right  285 00:26:27,840 --> 00:26:32,320 There is confusion among modern historians  about what Ewell was supposed to be doing during   286 00:26:32,320 --> 00:26:37,760 Longstreet’s assault. Lee later claimed that Ewell  was supposed to demonstrate and then attack once   287 00:26:37,760 --> 00:26:43,160 he heard Longstreet’s cannon fire. Ewell responded  that he was only supposed to attack if a suitable   288 00:26:43,160 --> 00:26:48,960 opportunity appeared and never heard Longstreet’s  guns anyway. Regardless, he had been ineffectively   289 00:26:48,960 --> 00:26:55,720 probing and bombarding Union positions on Cemetery  and Culp’s Hill since 16:00. Around 18:00,   290 00:26:55,720 --> 00:26:59,560 his troops discovered the defences had  been weakened to defend the left flank,   291 00:26:59,560 --> 00:27:05,200 and Ewell ordered a general attack at 19:00. Despite being lightly held, the Federal   292 00:27:05,200 --> 00:27:10,400 breastworks were formidable and backed with  artillery. The attack on Culp’s Hill captured   293 00:27:10,400 --> 00:27:15,760 abandoned rifle pits on the slope but halted as  darkness arrived. Early pushed through a gap,   294 00:27:15,760 --> 00:27:20,800 making it to the Baltimore Pike on East Cemetery  Hill before incoming Federal reinforcements and   295 00:27:20,800 --> 00:27:25,720 nightfall forced him to retreat. Fighting  on Culp’s Hill continued as some returning   296 00:27:25,720 --> 00:27:33,320 units stumbled on the rebels in the dark while  others intentionally launched night attacks.  297 00:27:33,320 --> 00:27:36,640 The Councils of War The guns finally fell silent around 22:30.   298 00:27:36,640 --> 00:27:42,280 Stuart finally shook his pursuers and rejoined  Lee that afternoon. After being thoroughly dressed   299 00:27:42,280 --> 00:27:47,360 down for leaving the army blind, he was ordered  to support Ewell, who was to bring up more troops   300 00:27:47,360 --> 00:27:53,160 and renew the attack on the heights the next day.  Longstreet continued arguing to disengage, but Lee   301 00:27:53,160 --> 00:27:58,280 wouldn’t hear it. Pickett’s division had finally  arrived, so a full-strength Longstreet was to   302 00:27:58,280 --> 00:28:03,920 attack again at dawn, simultaneously with Ewell. Meanwhile, Meade’s war council advised staying   303 00:28:03,920 --> 00:28:09,240 put. Their defences had been held, and the 6th  Corps’s arrival closed any holes remaining after   304 00:28:09,240 --> 00:28:14,640 the days’ battles. The 12th Corps returned to  Culp’s Hill to drive off the rebels, and Meade   305 00:28:14,640 --> 00:28:19,600 warned the 2nd Corps to dig in, particularly  Gibbon’s division. Lee had attacked both   306 00:28:19,600 --> 00:28:24,600 flanks today, and if he was following Napoleonic  doctrine, Gibbon’s position at the exact centre   307 00:28:24,600 --> 00:28:30,680 would be next. The BMI now had prisoners from  every Confederate unit but Pickett’s division.   308 00:28:30,680 --> 00:28:35,960 Whatever happened next would be led by him. Dawn of the Final Day - 24 Hours Remain  309 00:28:35,960 --> 00:28:40,360 Despite Lee’s intentions, Pickett’s division  wasn’t on the battlefield ready to attack   310 00:28:40,360 --> 00:28:45,720 when dawn broke . Worse, at dawn, the 12th  Corps’ artillery opened up in preparation   311 00:28:45,720 --> 00:28:51,320 for retaking the hill. The bombardment prompted  the Confederates to attack first. Lee tried to   312 00:28:51,320 --> 00:28:57,360 cancel the attack to preserve his plan, but Ewell  tersely responded, “Too late to recall.” Ewell’s   313 00:28:57,360 --> 00:29:02,000 attempts to further reinforce the hill were  halted by artillery fire from Cemetery Hill,   314 00:29:02,000 --> 00:29:08,981 and three waves of attacks failed against Union  breastworks. Ewell ordered a retreat around 11:00.  315 00:29:08,981 --> 00:29:10,520 Planning the Charge Therefore, Lee changed his   316 00:29:10,520 --> 00:29:15,800 plan . The Federals had to be close to breaking  after two days of hammering from his invincible   317 00:29:15,800 --> 00:29:21,520 army. They were pouring reinforcements onto Culp’s  Hill to drive off Ewell. His subordinates had   318 00:29:21,520 --> 00:29:26,080 reported making it to the top of the ridge  yesterday. He had George Pickett’s fresh,   319 00:29:26,080 --> 00:29:31,160 all-Virginian division ready. If he sent a  purposeful attack at the depleted center,   320 00:29:31,160 --> 00:29:39,640 it would surely shatter, especially if spearheaded  by Virginians and led by Longstreet, his warhorse.  321 00:29:39,640 --> 00:29:44,640 Lee’s plan was characteristically audacious.  Longstreet’s corps would assemble with Pickett   322 00:29:44,640 --> 00:29:50,040 in the lead behind Seminary Ridge while Stuart  moved around the Union right flank. Following   323 00:29:50,040 --> 00:29:55,160 a mass artillery barrage, both would charge the  Union center somewhere near where Cemetery Hill   324 00:29:55,160 --> 00:30:00,600 became Cemetery Ridge , splitting the army  in half. Longstreet was stunned, horrified,   325 00:30:00,600 --> 00:30:05,560 and strongly objected. McLaws and Hood’s  divisions were spent and too far south to   326 00:30:05,560 --> 00:30:09,840 get into position to attack. Even if they  could, he didn’t believe that Lee’s plan   327 00:30:09,840 --> 00:30:15,960 could be achieved by less than 30,000 troops and  begged Lee to reconsider. Lee was adamant about   328 00:30:15,960 --> 00:30:22,400 attacking with Longstreet's 15,000 but agreed  not to make McLaws and Hood redeploy. Instead,   329 00:30:22,400 --> 00:30:26,760 two divisions from Hill’s corps were added to  the attack force which Pickett would lead under   330 00:30:26,760 --> 00:30:30,960 Longstreet’s reluctant command. Stuart Stymied  331 00:30:30,960 --> 00:30:36,000 Stuart was informed of his role in the attack  around 10:00 and began moving once he was certain   332 00:30:36,000 --> 00:30:42,840 Ewell was retreating. At 11:00, he reached Cress’s  Ridge and signaled Lee by firing four cannons.   333 00:30:42,840 --> 00:30:48,000 This was a mistake. Union cavalry had been  watching for Stuart to attempt a flanking move,   334 00:30:48,000 --> 00:30:53,200 and upon hearing the cannons, they moved to  investigate. Skirmishers from McIntosh’s brigade   335 00:30:53,200 --> 00:30:59,600 made first contact, stalling Stuart. A Confederate  charge at 13:00 scattered the skirmishers after   336 00:30:59,600 --> 00:31:05,720 Union artillery knocked out Stuart’s guns. As the  Confederates rode forward, a cry rang out, “Come   337 00:31:05,720 --> 00:31:11,760 on, you wolverines!” Custer personally led the 7th  Michigan to charge Stuart’s lead brigade, breaking   338 00:31:11,760 --> 00:31:14,440 it after a fierce melee. Stuart counterattacked,  and Custer fell back in disarray. Stuart prepared   339 00:31:14,440 --> 00:31:19,480 another charge, but Custer again roared, “Come  on, you wolverines!” and led the 1st Michigan   340 00:31:19,480 --> 00:31:24,920 in a countercharge. Stuart realized that his  mission had failed. Even if he could push through,   341 00:31:24,920 --> 00:31:31,742 he’d never make it to the Union rear  in time. Therefore, he withdrew.  342 00:31:31,742 --> 00:31:33,720 Pickett’s Charge Lee intended to supplement Pickett   343 00:31:33,720 --> 00:31:39,160 with Hill’s least engaged divisions. However,  poor communication meant that Heath and Pender’s   344 00:31:39,160 --> 00:31:44,440 heavily depleted divisions were assigned to the  charge , despite the fact that both generals were   345 00:31:44,440 --> 00:31:50,440 incapacitated by wounds. It took all morning  to assemble all 13,000 men and position every   346 00:31:50,440 --> 00:31:55,880 battery in the army for the bombardment. At  13:00, the largest artillery barrage of the war   347 00:31:55,880 --> 00:32:04,000 began. Between 150 and 170 Confederate guns opened  fire on Cemetery Ridge. A similar number of Union   348 00:32:04,000 --> 00:32:10,080 guns responded. The bombardment was completely  ineffective. Most Confederate guns overshot,   349 00:32:10,080 --> 00:32:14,800 damaging Meade’s headquarters , supply wagons,  and the extensive reserve Meade had prepared   350 00:32:14,800 --> 00:32:20,720 but missing the actual defenders. Union gunners couldn’t effectively   351 00:32:20,720 --> 00:32:25,800 counter-battery due to thick gunsmoke and  dense trees , but they weren’t trying to.   352 00:32:25,800 --> 00:32:30,760 It was obvious an attack was coming, and they  were saving ammunition to repel it. The Union   353 00:32:30,760 --> 00:32:35,520 guns purposefully slowed and then stopped  firing one by one, tricking the Confederates   354 00:32:35,520 --> 00:32:41,040 into thinking they were silenced. Longstreet  tried to get anyone else to order the attack,   355 00:32:41,040 --> 00:32:47,120 finally giving in and doing it himself at 14:00  as Confederate gunners ran out of ammunition.  356 00:32:47,120 --> 00:32:52,040 The Confederates marched deliberately and steadily  forward, with Trimble and Pettigrew on the left   357 00:32:52,040 --> 00:32:58,000 and Pickett on the right. Anderson’s brigades  failed to advance for reasons unknown. Federal   358 00:32:58,000 --> 00:33:02,320 guns immediately opened up. The three  columns were supposed to gradually merge   359 00:33:02,320 --> 00:33:07,280 together for a concentrated strike, but the  fields concealed uneven ground interspersed   360 00:33:07,280 --> 00:33:15,920 with fences, ruining cohesion. Worse, Federal  artillery fire tore huge gaps in their lines.  361 00:33:15,920 --> 00:33:20,520 Union pickets in the fields opened fire and  then were bewildered as the Confederates   362 00:33:20,520 --> 00:33:26,840 marched past them . Orders were not to stop before  reaching the ridge, but many soldiers dissented.   363 00:33:26,840 --> 00:33:31,840 Thousands hid in depressions in the fields  and along the sunken Emmitsburg Road. Union   364 00:33:31,840 --> 00:33:36,200 defenders entrenched behind a series of stone  walls, as the rebels were at Fredericksburg,   365 00:33:36,720 --> 00:33:42,280 and opened fire at 400 yards. As the column  advanced and its line narrowed, Federal units   366 00:33:42,280 --> 00:33:47,960 advanced off the ridge to fire enfilade volleys.  Pettigrew and Trimble faltered and stopped just   367 00:33:47,960 --> 00:33:56,400 past Emmitsburg Road. Anderson’s brigades finally  advanced, but artillery quickly turned them back.  368 00:33:56,400 --> 00:34:01,360 However, Pickett’s division continued on towards  a turn in the stone wall and Alonzo Cushing’s   369 00:34:01,360 --> 00:34:06,240 battery. Hancock was wounded as he directed  fire on the column, and two of Pickett’s   370 00:34:06,240 --> 00:34:12,320 brigade commanders fell. However, Lewis Armistead  placed his hat atop his sword and led his men to   371 00:34:12,320 --> 00:34:19,120 charge the defences along the Angle. Several Union  regiments withdrew, letting Armistead and 250 men   372 00:34:19,120 --> 00:34:25,440 take Cushing’s guns. However, additional regiments  arrived and poured fire from three sides. No   373 00:34:25,440 --> 00:34:30,760 soldier who followed Armistead over the wall  returned to Confederate lines. Pickett’s Charge   374 00:34:30,760 --> 00:34:38,360 cost 8,000 Confederates casualties to 1,500 Union  and ended at 15:00 as survivors trickled back to   375 00:34:38,360 --> 00:34:46,200 Seminary Ridge. Thousands more would surrender  once Union troops found their hiding places.  376 00:34:46,200 --> 00:34:52,200 Back on Seminary Ridge, Lee simply hung his head  and said, “It’s all my fault.” He never explained   377 00:34:52,200 --> 00:34:56,800 his thinking beyond telling Jefferson Davis not  to blame the soldiers for Lee asking too much of   378 00:34:56,800 --> 00:35:02,160 them. Pickett was distraught, openly blamed Lee  for the disaster, and held the grudge for the   379 00:35:02,160 --> 00:35:08,360 rest of his life. His after-action report was  so accusatory that Lee had it burned. However,   380 00:35:08,360 --> 00:35:13,720 morale remained high, and some units offered  to reform and charge again, which Lee morosely   381 00:35:13,720 --> 00:35:19,240 refused. As Pickett’s Charge failed, Kilpatrick  decided to diminish the victory. He’d been   382 00:35:19,240 --> 00:35:24,800 ordered to patrol the left flank and keep watch  on Longstreet’s corps. However, Kilpatrick wanted   383 00:35:24,800 --> 00:35:29,960 to fight and ordered reckless charges against the  fortified infantry, which earned him the nickname   384 00:35:29,960 --> 00:35:37,236 Killcavalry. By 17:00, all the guns fell silent. Aftermath  385 00:35:37,236 --> 00:35:41,040 The Battle of Gettysburg was the largest  and deadliest battle ever fought in the   386 00:35:41,040 --> 00:35:47,440 Western Hemisphere, with over 150,000 men  engaging during three days of battle. Meade   387 00:35:47,440 --> 00:35:53,880 reported 23,049 casualties, about one-fourth  of his army. Lee’s reports are increasingly   388 00:35:53,880 --> 00:35:58,760 terse and vague about casualties from this  point onward. Historians agree he’d suffered   389 00:35:58,760 --> 00:36:05,120 between 23,000-28,000 casualties, over third of  his army. The North celebrated Meade’s heroic   390 00:36:05,120 --> 00:36:11,200 victory. News that Vicksburg had fallen added to  the euphoria . Over in Europe, Lord Palmerston   391 00:36:11,200 --> 00:36:16,960 quietly took recognition off the table. The  Confederacy had no chance at outright victory   392 00:36:16,960 --> 00:36:25,160 now. Halleck and Lincoln congratulated Meade  before ordering him to attack and destroy Lee.  393 00:36:25,160 --> 00:36:30,200 However, Meade’s army was in worse condition than  the casualty reports indicated. It had rapidly   394 00:36:30,200 --> 00:36:35,000 marched for a week and then spent three days  fighting in a sweltering summer heatwave . The   395 00:36:35,000 --> 00:36:40,680 water sources that weren’t fouled by blood were  being drunk dry by the influx of 150,000 thousand   396 00:36:40,680 --> 00:36:47,600 soldiers and at least that many animals to a  township of 2500. While no statistics were kept,   397 00:36:47,600 --> 00:36:53,000 war diaries and officers' reports suggest that  half of each army became heat-casualties at   398 00:36:53,000 --> 00:36:57,680 some point during the battle. Additionally,  it was foolish to move off the heights to   399 00:36:57,680 --> 00:37:03,120 attack a still dangerous enemy. All the terrain  advantages that won the battle would be reversed,   400 00:37:03,120 --> 00:37:08,760 and Meade refused to risk another Fredericksburg.  Additionally, a torrential rainstorm arrived.   401 00:37:08,760 --> 00:37:16,520 Both armies spent a soggy Independence Day  rescuing their wounded and exchanging prisoners.  402 00:37:16,520 --> 00:37:17,840 Lee Escapes Lee knew his invasion   403 00:37:17,840 --> 00:37:23,680 had failed and began preparing to retreat during  his nightly war council on July 3rd. Longstreet   404 00:37:23,680 --> 00:37:29,640 and Ewell pulled back to Seminary Ridge and built  breastworks, anticipating that Meade would attack.   405 00:37:29,640 --> 00:37:34,600 When he didn’t, Lee began slipping away on the  night of July 4th, starting with the thousands   406 00:37:34,600 --> 00:37:39,560 of supply wagons taken during the invasion.  Meade couldn’t move his infantry until he knew   407 00:37:39,560 --> 00:37:44,880 what Lee was doing. To that end, the cavalry  was dispatched on July 4th to harass Lee and   408 00:37:44,880 --> 00:37:50,640 report on his retreat. Pleasonton had some of his  divisions skirmish with Stuart while dispatching   409 00:37:50,640 --> 00:37:56,120 others to watch the roads south. Kilpatrick  partially redeemed himself by recapturing several   410 00:37:56,120 --> 00:38:03,800 hundred wagons in Monterey Pass the same day. Lee fully departed Gettysburg before dawn on   411 00:38:03,800 --> 00:38:09,200 July 5th, which Meade discovered midmorning.  However, he didn’t know where Lee was heading   412 00:38:09,200 --> 00:38:15,120 and remained in place until July 7th, when the  infantry moved south in three columns. Meanwhile,   413 00:38:15,120 --> 00:38:18,920 the cavalry continually clashed with  Stuart and the Confederate rearguard,   414 00:38:18,920 --> 00:38:23,360 capturing thousands of prisoners. Lee was  heading for the previously built pontoon   415 00:38:23,360 --> 00:38:28,240 bridges at Falling Waters between Hagerstown  and Williamsport. However, the bridges were   416 00:38:28,240 --> 00:38:34,800 destroyed by high waters worsened by heavy rains  on July 7, just as the army started arriving. Lee   417 00:38:34,800 --> 00:38:39,840 prepared fortifications to hold out until he  could cross again. The defences were finished   418 00:38:39,840 --> 00:38:45,800 just hours before Meade’s infantry began arriving  on July 12th. Seeing the extensive fortifications   419 00:38:45,800 --> 00:38:50,520 and still haunted by Fredericksburg, Meade  refused to attack without proper artillery   420 00:38:50,520 --> 00:38:57,440 preparation. He positioned the army for a  July 14th attack when the artillery was ready.  421 00:38:58,320 --> 00:39:02,720 Lee was counting on Meade recklessly attacking  him, which Halleck and Lincoln were screaming at   422 00:39:02,720 --> 00:39:08,320 him to do. Realizing that he was instead preparing  to bombard him into surrender, Lee ordered his   423 00:39:08,320 --> 00:39:14,600 engineers to get a bridge up NOW! This was done  by nightfall July 13th, with water levels falling   424 00:39:14,600 --> 00:39:20,680 enough to ford as well. By morning, Lee was across  the Potomac, though Meade continued pursuing him   425 00:39:20,680 --> 00:39:26,640 until the inconclusive Battle of Manassas Gap  on July 23rd. Lincoln was deeply frustrated,   426 00:39:26,640 --> 00:39:34,261 but historians debate whether a more aggressive  pursuit would have destroyed Lee or Meade’s army.  427 00:39:34,261 --> 00:39:35,400 End of the Campaign Both armies spent the rest   428 00:39:35,400 --> 00:39:40,760 of the summer licking their wounds. Meade would  advance again in September but halted after he had   429 00:39:40,760 --> 00:39:45,920 to dispatch troops for the Chattanooga Campaign.  Lee took the opportunity to launch a turning move   430 00:39:45,920 --> 00:39:51,520 on Meade’s right flank, but Meade proved too  cagey for Lee’s trap. Instead, the two fought a   431 00:39:51,520 --> 00:39:56,440 war of maneuver while failing to bring each  other to battle at an advantage . While Meade   432 00:39:56,440 --> 00:40:01,400 successfully pushed Lee behind the Rapidan, he was  forced to retreat to winter quarters in December,   433 00:40:01,400 --> 00:40:07,000 following a failed river crossing , to await the  arrival of a new General-in-Chief. This brings an   434 00:40:07,000 --> 00:40:12,000 end to the deadliest military engagement that  ever took place on American soil. In our next   435 00:40:12,000 --> 00:40:17,000 episode on the American Civil War, we will part  from the land war and take a brief interlude to   436 00:40:17,000 --> 00:40:21,600 discuss the naval theatre, so make sure you  are subscribed and pressed the bell button.   437 00:40:21,600 --> 00:40:26,200 Please consider liking, commenting, and sharing  – it helps immensely. 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